G ra zer P h ilo so p h isch e S tu d ien 6 0 (2 0 0 0 ) 9 9 -1 1 7 IN T E R N A L IS M , T H E G E T T IE R P R O B L E M , A N D M E T A E P IS T E M O L O G IC A L S K E P T IC IS M M y lan E N G E L , Jr. N o rth ern Illin o is U n iv ersity W e m u st reco g n ize th at w h en ev er w e k n o w so m eth in g w e eith er d o ,o r atleastcan ,b y reflectin g , d irectly k n o w th at w e are k n o w in g it. H . A . P rich ard ! S u m m a ry W h en it co m es to seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e (i.e.k n o w in g th ato n e k n o w s), in tem alists ty p ically co n ten d th at w h en w e k n o w th at p , w e can , b y reflectin g , d irectly k n o w th at w e are k n o w in g it.G ettier co n sid eratio n s are em p lo y ed to ch allen g e th is in tem alistic co n ten tio n an d to m ak e o u t a p rim a fa cie case fo r in tem alistic m etaep istem o lo g icalsk ep ticism ,th e th esis th at n o o n e ev er in tem alistically k n o w s th at o n e in tem alistically k n o w s th atp . In p articu lar, I arg u e th at at th e m etaep istem o lo g ical seco n d -o rd er lev el, th e G ettier p ro b lem g en erates th ree d istin ct p ro b lem s w h ich , tak en to g eth er,serio u sly u n d erm in e th e p o ssib ility o f an y o n e p o ssessin g seco n d -o rd er in tem alistic k n o w led g e. W h en it co m es to seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e, in tern alists ty p ically ech o P rich ard 's sen tim en tth atw e can ,sim p ly b y reflectin g o n it,d eterm in e o u r ep istem ic statu s w ith resp ect to a g iv en p ro p o sitio n . W h ile th ey d isag ree ab o u t th e ease w ith w h ich o n e can k n o w th at o n e k n o w s,th ey g en erally co n ten d th at th ere are n o in su rm o u n tab le 1 . H . A . P rich ard , K n o w led g e a n d P ercep tio n (O x fo rd : T h e C laren d o n P ress, 1 9 5 0 ),p . 8 6 . 1 0 0 o b stacles to seco n d -o rd erk n o w led g e.M y aim in th e p resen tp ap er is to em p lo y G ettier co n sid eratio n s to ch allen g e th is co n ten tio n an d to m ak e o u t a p rim a fa cie case fo r in tem alistic m etaep istem o lo g ical sk ep ticism ,th e th esis th atn o o n e ev erh as seco n d -o rd erin tem alistic k n o w led g e. I arg u e th at w h en it co m es to seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e th ere are th ree d istin ct G ettierp ro b lem s,each o f w h ich th reaten s th e p o ssib ility o f seco n d -o rd erin tem alistic k n o w led g e.I b eg in b y clarify in g th e n o tio n o f seco n d -o rd er in tem alistic k n o w led g e.2 1 . C o n sid er th e fo llo w in g q u estio n : Q 1 W h en , if ev er,d o es a p erso n k n o w th at sh e k n o w s th atp ? Q I is m u ltip ly am b ig u o u s sin ce itfails to sp ecify ,in eith er p lace,th e ty p e o f k n o w led g e at issu e.T o d isam b ig u ate Q I, let u s start b y d istin g u ish in g fallib le an d in fallib le k n o w led g e. B o th fallib ilists an d in fallib ilists ag ree th at, fo r an y p erso n S an d an y p ro p o sitio n p , (K ) S k n o w s th atp [K p ] o n ly if: (1 ) p , (2 ) S b eliev es th atp [B p ],an d (3 ) S is ju stified in b eliev in g th atp [Jp ]. W h ere th ey d isag ree is o v er th e k in d o fju stificatio n req u ired b y (3 ). 2 . M y arg u m en t sh o u ld n o t b e co n stru ed as an arg u m en t ag ain st in tern alism p er se. E x tern alists also face p ro b lem s, alb eit d ifferen t o n es, w h en it co m es to seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e, th o u g h th at is a to p ic fo r an o th er p ap er [T h o se in terested in so m e o f th e p ro b lem s th at seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e p o ses fo r ex tern alism sh o u ld see R ich ard F u m erto n 's M eta ep istem o lo g y a n d S kep ticism (L an h am , M ary lan d : R o m an an d L ittlefield , 1 9 9 5 ), esp ecially ch ap ter 6 "E x tern alism an d S k ep ticism ", p p . 1 5 9 -1 8 1 .]. M y aim is sim p ly to sh o w th at, g iv en in tem alism , w e d o n o th av e th e k in d o f d irectaccess to o u r ep istem ic statu s th at m o stin tern alists th in k w e d o .I arg u e th at th ere is g o o d reaso n to b eliev e th at, g iv en in tem alism , w e n ev er k n o w th at w e k n o w an y th in g , a co n clu sio n m o st in tern alists w ill fin d b o th d isq u ietin g an d u n w elco m e. 1 0 1 In fallib ilists m ain tain th at k n o w led g e req u ires in fallib le ju stificatio n ju stificatio n w h ich en tails th at fo r w h ich it is ju stificatio n . S is in fa llib ly ju stified in b eliev in g th at p [JIp ] o n ly ifp . A cco rd in g ly , w e can an aly ze in fa llib le kn o w led g e as fo llo w s: (K I) K Ip = =(.p & B p & JIp ). F allib ilists, o n th e o th er h an d , co n ten d th at th e k in d o f ju stificatio n req u isite fo r k n o w led g e n eed o n ly ren d er p ro b ab le, n o t en tail, th at fo r w h ich it is ju stificatio n . A s su ch , fallib ilism en tails th e fo llo w in g p o ssib ility : (P I) O (JF p & ~ p ). P o ssib ility (P I) an d d ed u ctiv e clo su re w ith resp ect to ju stificatio n to g eth er en tail n u m ero u s "G ettier P o ssib ilities", in clu d in g : (P 2 ) O [B p & JF p & JF (p ---7q ) & B (p ---7q ) & JF q & B q & q & ~ p & ~ K F q ]. P o ssib ility (P 2 ) o b tain s w h en ,as G ettier illu strated ,3 S h as a fallib ly ju stified tru e b eliefth atq w h ich falls sh o rto f k n o w led g e b ecau se S 's ju stificatio n fo r q [to w it, B p & JF p & JF (p ---7q ) & B (.p ---7q )] fails to b e ap p ro p riately co n n ected to q 's tru th an d th u s is d efectiv e.4 S in ce fallib ilism en tails (P 2 ),a fo u rth co n d itio n m u stb e ad d ed to th e trad itio n al an aly sis o f k n o w led g e to ru le o u tG ettier cases as in stan ces o f k n o w led g e.F o r o u rp u rp o ses,th e fo llo w in g co n d itio n w illsu ffice: (4 ) S is n o t G ettierized w ith resp ect to p [~ G p ]. A cco rd in g ly , w e can a n a lyzefa llib le kn o w led g e as fo llo w s: 3 . E d m u n d G ettier, "Is Ju stified T ru e B elief K n o w led g e?", A n a lysis, 2 3 (1 9 6 3 ), p p . 1 2 1 -1 2 3 . 4 . In th e case o f p o ssib ility (P 2 ),S 's ju stificatio n is d efectiv e b ecau se it essen tially d ep en d s o n S 's ju stified -b u t:fa lse b eliefB p . H o w ev er,as w e sh allsee in sectio n V , th ere are cases o f d efectiv e ju stificatio n th at d o n o t in v o lv e ju stified -b u t-false b eliefs as ju stifiers. 1 0 2 (K F ) K F p = = (p & B p & JF p & ~ G p ). G iv en th ese d efin itio n s, th ere are fo u r p o ssib le states o f seco n d o rd er k n o w led g e w e m ig h tb e in q u irin g ab o u tw h en w e ask w h eth er S k n o w s th at S k n o w s th atp : (S l) (S 2 ) (S 3 ) (S 4 ) K IK lp . K IK F p . K F K lp . K F K F p . O f th ese fo u r p o ssib le states o f k n o w led g e, clearly (S I) an d (S 2 ) w o u ld b e th e m o st in tellectu ally an d p h ilo so p h ically satisfy in g , sin ce in b o th cases, w e w o u ld b e in fallib ly certain th at w e w ere rig h t w ith resp ect to p . U n fo rtu n ately , th e leg acy o f in fallib ilism , at least w ith resp ect to n o n -co g ito em p irical p ro p o sitio n s, is sk ep ticism .s S in ce in fallib ilism en tails sk ep ticism w ith resp ect to n o n -co g ito em p irical p ro p o sitio n s an d sin ce self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n s6 are th em selv es n o n -co g ito em p irical p ro p o sitio n s, it fo llo w s th at n eith er (S I) n o r (S 2 ) is p o ssib le. A s fo r (S 3 ), su ch k n o w led g e, if an y , w ill b e ex trem ely rare as it is restricted to co g ito p ro p o sitio n s. T h u s, th e m o st p lau sib le ty p e o f seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e is th at su g g ested b y (S 4 ), v iz. fallib ly k n o w in g th at o n e fallib ly k n o w s th atp . M y co n cern in th e p resen t p ap er is w ith th is fo u rth fo rm o f seco n d -o rd er 5 . T h is w as p erh ap s first illu strated b y T h o m as R eid w h o o b serv ed th at D escartes' in fallib ilism , to g eth er w ith h is th eo ry o f id eas, in ev itab ly lead s to sk ep ticism w ith resp ect to em p irical k n o w led g e. S ee R eid 's A n In q u iry in to th e H u m a n M in d o n th e P rin cip les o f C o m m o n S en se an d h is E ssa ys o n th e In tellectu a l P o - . w ers o f M a n , th e d efin itiv e ed itio n s o f w h ich ap p ear in T h e C o m p lete W o rks o f T h o m a s R eid , ed . W illiam H am ilto n , 6 th ed itio n (E d in b u rg h : M aclach lan an d S tew art; an d L o n d o n : L o n g m an , G reen , L o n g m an , R o b erts, an d G reen , 1 8 6 3 ). T h e p o in t can b e m ad e q u ite sim p ly as fo llo w s: S in ce o u r ev id en ce fo r n o n -co g ito em p irical p ro p o sitio n s n ev er en tails th e tru th o fth o se p ro p o sitio n s (as d em o n strated b y d em o n -m an ip u lated p o ssib le w o rld s), it fo llo w s th at ifth e k in d o f ju stificatio n req u ired fo r k n o w led g e is in fallib le tru th -en tailin g ju stificatio n , th en w e are n ev er ju stified in b eliev in g , an d h en ce n ev er k n o w , th at su ch p ro p o sitio n s are tru e. 6 . B y 'self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n s' I m ean p ro p o sitio n s w h ich ascrib e k n o w led g e o f a p ro p o sitio n to o n eself a s o n eself, e.g . th e p ro p o sitio n th at I k n o w th at p . I b o rro w th is term in o lo g y fro m R ich ard F eld m an (1 9 8 1 , p . 2 6 9 ). 1 0 3 k n o w led g e. T h at said , th e "F " su p erscrip tw illb e su p p ressed fro m all su b seq u en t seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e fo rm u lae,b u t it sh o u ld b e u n d ersto o d th at I am co n cern ed w ith K F K F pth ro u g h o u tth e rem ain d er o f th e p ap er. II. In lig h to fth e p rev io u s sectio n ,Q 1 can b e refo rm u lated as fo llo w s: Q I' W h en ,if ev er,d o es a p erso n fallib ly k n o w th at sh e fallib ly k n o w s th atp ? B u t ev en w ith th e fallib ilistic q u alifiers, Q 1' rem ain s am b ig u o u s in lig h t o f th e in tern alist/ex tern alist d istin ctio n . L et u s stip u late th at S in tern a listica lly kn o w s th at p [K iP ] o n ly if S is in tern alistically ju stified in b eliev in g th at p [liP ], w h ere S is in tern alistically ju stified in b eliev in g th at p iff S 's ju stificatio n fo r p is ex clu siv ely a fu n ctio n o f states in tern al to S (i.e. states to w h ich S h as co g n itiv e access, e.g . b eliefs, p ercep tu al states, m em o ry states, in tro sp ectiv e states, etc.). F o rm alizin g , w e g et: (K J K ip = = (p & B p & Jip & ~ G p ).7 In E n g lish , (K j) asserts: S in tern alistically k n o w s (k n O W S i)th atp iff: (k l) p , (k 2 ) S b eliev es th atp , (k 3 ) S is in tern alistically ju stified (ju stified i) in b eliev in g th atp , an d (k 4 ) S is n o t G ettierized w ith resp ectto p . 7 . N O T E : W h at I am callin g 'in tem alistic k n o w led g e', as d efin ed b y (K J, still req u ires th e satisfactio n o f tw o ex tem alistic co n d itio n s,n am ely ,p an d -G p . S o m e in tem alists h av e w an ted to in sist th at th ey are in tem alists w ith resp ect to ju stificatio n , b u t ex tem alists w ith resp ect to k n o w led g e b ecau se o f co n d itio n s p an d -G p . B u t th e cru cial p o in t is th at as in tem alists th ey w o u ld accep t (K J w ith its in tem alistic ju stificatio n co n d itio n Jip as a p ro p er an aly sis o f k n o w led g e. (K j* ) 1 0 4 In co n trast, S extern a listica lly kn o w s th atp [K eP ]o n ly if S 's b elief th at p is ex tern alistically ju stified [JeP ],w h ere S 's b elief th at p is ex tern alistically ju stified iff w h atju stifies S 's b eliefth atp is at least p artly a fu n ctio n o f states ex tern al to S (i.e. states to w h ich S lack s co g n itiv e access,e.g .th e actu alreliab ility o f th e p ro cess w h ich p ro d u ced B p ). A cco rd in g ly ,w e can d efin e ex tern alistic k n o w led g e as fo llo w s: eK e) K ep = = (p & B p & JeP & ~ G p ). (K i) an d (K e) en tail th at th ere are m an y p o ssib le states o f seco n d o rd er k n o w led g e. C o n sid er th e m o st o b v io u s fo u r: (S 5 ) (S 6 ) (S 7 ) (S 8 ) K iK iP . K iK ep . K eK iP . K eK ep .8 I assu m e th at w h en in tern alists claim th at w h en ev er w e k n o w so m eth in g , w e can , b y reflectin g , d irectly co m e to k n o w th at w e k n o w it, th ey h av e K jK jp in m in d . S o , w h ile all o f th ese d ifferen t p o ten tial states o f seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e are o f in terest, I sh all fo cu s o n (S 5 ). 8 . T h e reaso n (S 5 )-(S 8 ) d o n o t ex h au st th e p o ssib ilities is b ecau se, as I h av e d efin ed in tem alistic an d ex tem alistic k n o w led g e, th ey are n o t m u tu ally ex clu siv e. M y h av in g ex trem ely g o o d ev id en ce fo r p (w h ich in tem alistically ju stifies m e in b eliev in g th at p ) is co m p atib le w ith m y b elief th at p h av in g b een p ro d u ced b y a reliab le co g n itiv e p ro cess (w h ich ex tem alistically ju stifies m y b elief th at p ). [F o r a fu rth er d iscu ssio n o fth e d istin ctio n b etw een in tem alistically ju stified p erso n s an d ex tem alistically ju stified b eliefs, see m y "P erso n al an d D o x astic Ju stificatio n in E p istem o lo g y ", P h ilo so p h ica l S tu d ies, 6 7 (1 9 9 2 ), p p . 1 3 3 -1 5 0 .] L et u s rep resen t th e p o ssib ility o f sim u ltan eo u sly satisfy in g (K i) an d (K e) as: K iep . G iv en th is p o ssib ility it is o b v io u s th at (S 5 )-(S ~ ) d o n o t ex h au st th e seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e p o ssib ilities. H ere are a few m o re: K iK ieP ; K eK ieP ; K ieK ieP ;K ieK iP ; K ieK ep . 1 0 5 III. In lig h t o f th e fo reg o in g , Q l' sh o u ld itself b e refo rm u lated as fo llo w s: Q l" W h en , if ev er,d o es a p erso n in tern alistically (fallib ly ) k n o w th at sh e in tern alistically (fallib ly )k n o w s th atp ? W h ile n u m ero u s an sw ers h av e b een p ro p o sed ,9th e m o stn atu ral an d m o st p lau sib le an sw er to Q 1 " is arriv ed at b y su b stitu tin g K ip fo r p in (K i) ab o v e: (K iK i) K iK ip = =(K iP & B K ip & JjK ip & ~ G K iP ). O r, eq u iv alen tly : (K iK /) S k n O W S ith at S kn O W S ith a t p iff: (k k l) S kn o w si th a t p , 9 . H in tik k a (1 9 6 2 ), H ilp in en (1 9 7 0 ), an d L eh rer (1 9 7 4 ) h av e d efen d ed th e "p u re K K -th esis" acco rd in g to w h ich k n o w in g en tails k n o w in g th at o n e k n o w s: (P K K ) K iP ~ K iK iP ' D an to (1 9 6 7 ) d efen d s w h at m ig h t b e called th e "sem an tic K K -th esis" acco rd in g to w h ich : (S K K ) (K iP & U K iP ) ~ K iK ip , w h ere U K iP = S u n d erstan d s th e self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n th at S kn o w s th a t p . P rich ard (1 9 5 0 ) an d C h ish o lm (1 9 7 7 ) h av e d efen d ed w h at m ig h t b e called th e "reflectiv e K K -th esis": (R K K ) (K iP & C K iP ) ~ K iK ip , w h ere C K iP = S co n sid ers th e self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n th at S kn o w s th a t p . G in et (1 9 7 0 ) d efen d s th e d o x astic K K -th esis acco rd in g to w h ich : (D K K ) (K iP & B K ip ) ~ K iK iP . A s w e sh all see in sectio n V I, th e p o ssib ility o f seco n d -o rd er G ettierizatio n en tails th at all o f th ese p ro p o sals are false. S in ce n o su b set o fth e co n d itio n s sp ecified in (K u is su fficien t to g u aran tee th at S is n o t G ettierized w ith resp ect to th e self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n K iP an d sin ce n o n e o f th e an teced en ts in th e ab o v e p ro p o sals en tails th at S is n o t G ettierized w ith resp ect to K iP , it fo llo w s th at in o rd er fo r S to h av e seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e (i.e. fo r S to k n o w a g iv en self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n K iP ), S m u st satisfy all o fth e co n d itio n s fo r k n o w led g e sim p liciter w ith resp ect to th e self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n in q u estio n . 1 0 6 (k k 2 ) (k k 3 ) (k k 4 ) S b eliev es th at S kn o w s; th a tp , S is ju stified i in b eliev in g th at S kn o w s;th a tp , an d S is n o tG ettierized w ith resp ectto th e p ro p o sitio n th at S kn o w s;th a tp . I sh all refer to (K jK /) as "th e iterativ e K K -th esis". In "F allib ilism an d K n o w in g th at O n e K n o w s",R ich ard F eld m an d efen d s th e iterativ e K K -th esis an d arg u es th at th e G ettier p ro b lem p o ses a m in o r, b u t h ard ly in su rm o u n tab le, o b stacle to seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e. 1 0 F eld m an 's arg u m en ts fo r iterativ e K K are d ecisiv e an d w ill n o t b e rep eated h ere. W h ere I d isag ree w ith F eld m an is o v er th e ease w ith w h ich (K jK j* )'s a n a lysa n s can b e satisfied . F eld m an co n ten d s th at it is relativ ely easy to satisfy co n d itio n s (k k 1 )-(k k 4 ) an d th at th e h in d ran ce w h ich th e G ettier p ro b lem p o ses fo r seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e can b e o v erco m e w ith m in im al in tellectu al effo rt. In w h at is to fo llo w , I sh all arg u e th at th e G ettier p ro b lem g en erates th ree d istin ct o b stacles fo r th e w o u ld -b e seco n d -o rd er k n o w er o b stacles co rresp o n d in g to (k k 1 ), (k k 3 ), an d (k k 4 ),resp ectiv ely an d th at at least tw o o f th ese p ro b lem s ap p ear to b e in su rm o u n tab le, at least w h ere in tern alistic seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e is.co n cern ed . IV . O n e w ay in w h ich th e G ettier p ro b lem can p reclu d e S fro m k n o w in g th at sh e k n o w s th atp is b y p rev en tin g S fro m k n o w in g th atp . If S is G ettierized w ith resp ectto p , th en S fails to k n o w th atp an d a fo rtio ri sh e fails to k n o w th at sh e k n o w s th atp , sin ce (k k 1 ) o f (K jK j* )is u n satisfied . C all su ch G ettierizatio n "first-o rd er G ettierizatio n ". W h en ev er S is first-o rd er G ettierized w ith resp ect to p , S lack s b o th first-o rd er an d seco n d -o rd erk n o w led g e th atp . T h u s,th e firstw ay in 1 0 . R ich ard F eld m an , "F allib i1 ism an d K n o w in g th at O n e K n o w s", P h ilo so p h ica l R eview , X C (1 9 8 1 ), p p . 2 6 6 -2 8 1 . F o r an earlier d efen se o fth e iterativ e K K -th esis, see P eter K lein 's "A P ro p o sed D efin itio n o f P ro p o sitio n al K n o w led g e", Jo u rn a l o f P h ilo so p h y, L X V III (1 9 7 1 ), p p . 4 7 1 -4 8 2 . L ik e F eld m an , K lein m ain tain s th at th ere is n o sp ecial p ro b lem w ith satisfy in g (k k l)-(k k 4 ) o f (~ K i* ). (p p . 4 8 0 f.) 1 0 7 w h ich th e G ettier p ro b lem can u n d erm in e seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e is th ro u g h a ctu a l first-o rd er G ettierizatio n . O f co u rse, a ctu a l first-o rd er G ettierizatio n falsifies (k k 1 ) an d ip so fa cto p reclu d es seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e w h en b u t o n ly w h en it o b tain s, an d so , it p o ses n o g reater an d n o less th reat to seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e th an it p o ses to first-o rd er k n o w led g e. A s ju st n o ted , th e first G ettier o b stacle to seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e a ctu a l first-o rd er G ettierizatio n u n d erm in es K jK ip b y u n d erm in in g K jp . H o w ev er, ev en w h en K ip is tru e, th e G ettier p ro b lem p resen ts tw o m o re o b stacles fo r th e w o u ld -b e seco n d -o rd er k n o w er. In o rd er to m ak e th ese ad d itio n al o b stacles as p ersp icu o u s as p o ssib le, I w ill assu m e th at S d o es in fact p o ssess first-o rd er k n o w led g e th at p [i.e. I w ill assu m e K ip ] th ro u g h o u t th e rem ain d er o f th e p ap er. v . W h ile a ctu a l first-o rd er G ettierizatio n , w h en it o b tain s, u n d erm in es K jK jp b y falsify in g (k k 1 ), p o ssib le (b u t n o n -actu al) first-o rd er G ettierizatio n th reaten s to th w art o n e o f th e m o st n atu ral w ay s o f satisfy in g (k k 3 ). A cco rd in g to (k k 3 ), in o rd er fo r S to k n O W jth at sh e k n O W S jth atp , S m u st b e ju stified j in b eliev in g th at sh e k n O W S jth atp . W h ile th ere are n u m ero u s w ay s in w h ich S m ig h t satisfy (k k 3 ),th e m o st straig h tfo rw ard w ay is fo rS to b e ju stified jin b eliev in g th at sh e h as satisfied allth e co n d itio n s n eed ed fo rfirst-o rd erk n o w led g ejth at p , i.e. fo r S to b e ju stified j in b eliev in g th at each co n d itio n in th e a n a lysa n s o f (K j* ) is satisfied : (JjK jp -l) S is ju stified j in b eliev in g th at K jp if: (jk 1 -1 ) S is ju stified j in b eliev in g th atp , (jk l-2 ) S is ju stified jin b eliev in g th at S b eliev es th at p , U k 1 -3 ) S isju stified jin b eliev in g th atS isju stified jin b eliev in g th atp , an d U k l-4 ) S isju stified iin b eliev in g th atS is n o tG ettierized w ith resp ect to p . 1 0 8 S in ce G k l-l) is id en ticalto (k 3 ),G k l-l) is o b v io u sly satisfied o n th e assu m p tio n th atS k n o w s th atp . Ifw e assu m e b o th d o x astic an d ju stificato ry tran sp aren cy (i.e. in tro sp ectiv e accessib ility ),as d o m an y in tern alists, th en G k l-2 ) an d G k l-3 ) p o se n o sp ecial p ro b lem s fo r th e w o u ld -b e seco n d -o rd er k n o w er.It is w o rth n o tin g th at b o th o f th ese assu m p tio n s are co n tro v ersial an d if false w o u ld fu rth er su p p o rt m etaep istem o lo g ical sk ep ticism .H o w ev er,fo r th e sak e o f arg u m en t,I w ill g ran t th at th ere are n o sp ecialo b stacles to satisfy in g G k l-l)-G k l-3 ). M y co n cern is w ith G k l-4 ). C o n d itio n G k l-4 ) req u ires th atS b e ju stified iin b eliev in g th at th e p o ssib ility o f b ein g first-o rd er G ettierized w ith resp ectto p d o es n o t o b tain . W h eth er G k l-4 ) can b e satisfied fro m an in tern alistic p ersp ectiv e tu rn s o n th e fo llo w in g q u estio n s: Q 2 C o u ld S ju stifiab lY ib eliev e th at (k 4 ) is satisfied w ith resp ect to a g iv en p ? Q 3 C o u ld S ju stifiab lY ib eliev e th at h er ev id en ce fo rp is n o t d efectiv e an d th at,as a resu lt,sh e is n o ta h ap less G ettierv ictim w ith resp ect to p ? W h ile th ere are a p leth o ra o f d ifferen tin tern alistic th eo ries o fju stificatio n ,w h atth ey allh av e in co rn m o n is th atth ey m ain tain th atju stificatio n is ex clu siv ely a fu n ctio n o f in tern ally accessib le ev id en ce [T h e ev id en ce m ay b e eith er ex p erien tialo r p ro p o sitio n alin -n atu re, b u tm u stb e co g n itiv ely av ailab le to th e co g n izer.]T h u s,re Q 2 ,if S is to b e ju stified i in b eliev in g th at (k 4 ) is satisfied w ith resp ect to a g iv en p , sh e m u st p o ssess in tern ally accessib le ev id en ce o f (k 4 )'s tru th . It is n o t en tirely clear w h at su ch ev id en ce w o u ld lo o k lik e, sin ce ev en in tern alists g en erally reg ard (k 4 ) as an ex tern alistic n ecessary co n d itio n fo r k n o w led g e,IIb u t p resu m ab ly it w o u ld b e ev id en ce in d icatin g th at h er first-o rd er ev id en ce fo rp is n o t d efectiv e, w h ich b rin g s u s to Q 3 : Q 3 C o u ld S ju stifiab lY ib eliev e th at h er ev id en ce fo rp is n o t d efectiv e an d th at,as a resu lt,sh e is n o ta h ap less G ettierv ictim w ith resp ect to p ? 1 1 . "E x tem alistic" in th e sen se th at K iP o n ly req u ires th at (k 4 ) b e satisfied , n o t th at S b e a b le to tell th at it is satisfied . 1 0 9 F eld m an an sw ers Q 3 in th e affirm ativ e an d o ffers tw o arg u m en ts to sh o w th at it is relativ ely easy to b eju stified i in b eliev in g th at o n e's first-o rd er ev id en ce is n o t d efectiv e. F irst, if, p er o u r assu m p tio n , S k n O W S ith at p , th en S is ju stified i in b eliev in g th at p . S in ce S is ju stified i in b eliev in g th atp , sh e is also ju stified i in b eliev in g th at all o f h er ev id en ce fo r p is tru e. A s su ch , sh e is ju stified i in b eliev in g th at h er b elief th at p d o es n o t rest o n an y false assu m p tio n s. S in ce, acco rd in g to F eld m an , "[false ev id en ce] is w h at u su ally m ak es o n e's ju stificatio n d efectiv e, sh e is ju stified in b eliev in g th at h er ju stificatio n is'n o t d efectiv e". 1 2S eco n d , F eld m an arg u es: [s],if sh e is lik e th e resto f u s,h as fo u n d th atin th e p ast v ery few o fh er ju stified b eliefs h av e b een d efectiv ely ju stified . T h at is, sh e h as v ery rarely fo u n d h erself to b e th e v ictim O fsitu atio n s so m ew h at lik e th o se in G ettier-ex am p les, in w h ich a p erso n h as a ju stified b elief th at d ep en d s u p o n so m e false p ro p o sitio n . S h e h as reaso n to b eliev e, th en , th at sh e is n o t su ch a v ictim in th is case.T h u s,sh e is ju stified in b eliev in g th at h er ju stificatio n [fo rp ] is n o t d efectiv e.1 3 N eith er o f th ese reaso n s is ad eq u ate to ju stify S in b eliev in g th ath er first-o rd erju stificatio n fo rp is n o t d efectiv e.A s fo r F eld m an 's first reaso n , it is su rp risin g th at h e w o u ld ev en o ffer su ch a reaso n sin ce, in a m u ch earlier article (1 9 7 4 ), F eld m an h im self sh o w ed th at o n e can b e G ettierized w ith resp ect to p ev en w h en allo f o n e's ev id en ce fo rp is tru e an d ev en w h en o n e k n o w s th atallo f o n e's ev id en ce fo rp is tru e..1 4A s it tu rn s o u t, cases lik e th e o n e F eld m an d escrib ed in 1 9 7 4 ab o u n d .C o n sid er a v ersio n o f B rian S k y rm s'fam o u s ex am p le co n cern in g S u re-F ire m atch es.ISP y ro m an iac P ete tru ly an d ju stifiab ly b eliev es an d k n o w s th at S u re-F ire m atch es h av e alw ay s lit in th e p ast w h en stru ck .P ete tru ly an d ju stifiab ly b eliev es an d k n o w s th at th e m atch h e is h o ld in g is a S u re-F ire m atch .O n th e b asis o fth is ev id en ce,P ete ju stifiab ly b eliev es th atL ,w h ere L = th e m atch th at I am h o ld in g w ill lig h t w h en stru ck .H o w ev er,u n b ek n o w n stto P ete, th e m atch h e is h o ld in g is a d efectiv e S u re-F ire m atch (th e first 1 2 . R ich ard F eld m an n , "F allib ilism an d K n o w in g th at O n e K n o w s", p .2 7 3 . 1 3 . Ib id ., p . 2 7 3 f. 1 4 . R ich ard F eld m an , "A n A lleg ed D efect in G ettier C o u n ter-E x am p les", A u stra la sia n Jo u rn a l o f P h ilo so p h y, 5 2 , 1 (1 9 7 4 ), p p . 6 8 -6 9 . 1 5 . B rian S k y rm s,"T h e E x p licatio n o f 'X k n o w s th a tp "',Jo u rn a l o fP h ilo so p h y,6 4 , 1 2 (1 9 6 7 ), p p . 3 7 3 -3 8 9 . 1 1 0 ev er!) w ith im p u rities w h ich raise its co m b u stio n tem p eratu re ab o v e th at w h ich can b e p ro d u ced b y strik in g frictio n . A s lu ck w o u ld h av e it,ju st as P ete strik es th e m atch , a su d d en b u rst o fQ -rad iatio n ig n ites th e m atch . T h u s, P ete h as a ju stified tru e b eliefth at L w h ich is b ased en tirely o n tru e ev id en ce w h ich P ete k n o w s to b e tru e. 1 6T h e fact th at ex am p les lik e F eld m an 's an d S k y rm s' are easy to m u ltip ly sh o w s th at ev en if th e q u in tessen tial G ettier cases are cases in w h ich S 's ju stificatio n fo r p essen tially d ep en d s o n a ju stified -b u tfalse b elief th at q , th ere are still m an y G ettier cases w h ich ap p eal o n ly to tru e ev id en ce. A s a resu lt, th e fact th at S is ju stified in b eliev in g th at all o f h er ev id en ce fo r p is tru e d o es n o t ju stify h er in b eliev in g th at sh e h as n o t b een G ettierized , fo r sh e still m ig h t b e th e v ictim o f an "alltru e-ev id en ce-G ettierizati o n " . F eld m an 's seco n d reaso n n am ely , th at S h as rarely fo u n d h erself to b e th e v ictim o fG ettier cases fares n o b etter, fo r as M ich ael R o th p o in ts o u t: T h ere are at leasttw o p lau sib le ex p lan atio n s fo r w h y sh e h as so rarely d isco v ered h erself to h av e b een fo o led b y su ch cases. T h e first an d m o st o b v io u s is th at sh e h as rarely ,if ev er,b een in su ch cases an d if th is w ere th e o n ly ex p lan atio n o r ev en th e o n ly p lau sib le ex p lan atio n ,th en o n e co u ld ju stifiab ly arg u e th at fro m th e fact th at [S ] h as rarely fo u n d h erself to b e in su ch situ atio n s it fo llo w ed th at sh e (m o st lik ely ) h as rarely , if ev er, b een in su ch situ atio n s. B u t fo r a larg e class o f G ettier-ty p e cases, w e co u ld easily im ag in e th at th e v ictim sim p ly n ev er fin d s o u tth at sh e h as b een v ictim ized .If itw as th e b u rst o f Q -rad iatio n ,rath er th an th e m atch -co v er w h ich cau sed m y m atch to ig n ite,I w o u ld h av e b een th e v ictim o f a G ettier case b u tw o u ld n 't h av e an y reaso n to b eliev e th atI w as.T h u s,a seco n d p lau sib le ex p lan atio n fo r w h y o n e so rarely d isco v ers o n e's o w n G ettier cases is th atth ey o ccu r (w ith m o re o r less freq u en cy ),th ey lo o k an d feelex actly lik e item s o f k n o w led g e, an d th ey p ass aw ay u n d etected .1 7 1 6 . N O T E : P ete d o es n o t h av e to h o ld th e false b elief th at th e m atch h e is h o ld in g is n o t a d efectiv e m atch ,in o rd er to b e ju stified in b eliev in g th atL .G iv en S u re-F ire m atch es p erfect track reco rd , h e n eed h av e n o b eliefs at allco n cern in g w h eth er o r n o t th is m atch is a d efectiv e m atch , an d in all lik elih o o d , h e w o u ld h av e n o su ch b eliefs. T h e p o ssib ility sim p ly w o u ld n 't cro ss h is m in d , an d n o tb ecau se h e su ffers fro m so m e so rt o f ep istem ic d efect. 1 7 . M ich ael R o th , "T h e W all an d th e S h ield : K -K R eco n sid ered ", P h ilo 1 1 1 R o th 's p o in t is sim p ly th is: M an y o f th e G ettier cases d escrib ed in th e literatu re are w h at w e m ig h t call "in v isib le G ettier cases", i.e. th ey are cases w h ich , w ere th ey to o b tain ,th e v ictim w o u ld n ev er fin d o u t. N o w if ev ery im ag in ab le in v isib le G ettier case w ere ex trem ely fan cifu lan d h ig h ly co n triv ed ,th en th at m ig h t-g iv e u s a reaso n to th in k th at su ch cases w ere rare; b u t in fact, w e can im ag in e m an y in v isib le G ettier cases w h ich are far less fan cifu l an d co n triv ed th an th e G ettier cases ty p ically fo u n d in th e literatu re. C o n sid er th e fo llo w in g ex am p le:S ittin g in m y o ffice atn o o n ,I su d d en ly w o n d er if th e d o o rs to m y h o u se are lo ck ed . T h en I recall lo ck in g th em an d d o u b le-ch eck in g th em to m ak e su re th at th ey w ere lo ck ed w h en I left th e h o u se earlier th is m o rn in g .A s a resu lt,I co m e to b eliev e th at th ey are lo ck ed .U n b ek n o w n stto m e, m y p artn er w h o left th e h o u se b efo re m e,fo rg o t so m eth in g sh e n eed ed fo r w o rk ,an d retu rn ed to g et it after I h ad left. S in ce sh e lo ck ed th e d o o rs w h en sh e left, itis tru e atn o o n th at th e d o o rs are lo ck ed .H en ce,I h av e a ju stified tru e b elief th at th e d o o rs to m y h o u se are lo ck ed , b u t I d o n o t k n o w th at th ey are lo ck ed b ecau se m y rea so n m y h av in g lo ck ed th em w h en I left is n o t th e reaso n th ey are lo ck ed at n o o n . T h in g s lik e th is h ap p en all th e tim e. W h y d o w e so rarely fin d o u t th at w e w ere G ettierized ? W h y , fo r ex am p le, d o w e so rarely d isco v er th at o u r p artn ers h av e retu rn ed h o m e after w e left th e h o u se an d lo ck ed th e d o o rs o n th eir w ay o u t? B ecau se, at th e en d o f an ex h au stin g d ay , o u r p artn ers sim p ly n ev er th in k to tell u s ab o u t th eir h ectic m o rn in g s. O r p erh ap s th ey rem em b er to tell u s ab o u t th eir h ectic m o rn in g s o v er co ffee a few d ay s later, an d w e n ev er m ak e th e co n n ectio n th at it o ccu rred o n th e d ay w h en w e th o u g h t w e k n ew th e d o o rs w ere lo ck ed . A d d to th is th e fact th at m o st p eo p le h av e n ev er h ad a co u rse in ep istem o lo g y an d h av e n ev er h eard o f G ettier cases, an d it is n o w o n d er th at so few p eo p le reco g n ize th at th ey h av e b een G ettierized . A fter all, m o st p eo p le d o n o t ev en k n o w to b e o n th e lo o k o u t fo r su ch cases. It is co n sid eratio n s su ch as th ese w h ich m ak e it p lau sib le to th in k th at in v isib le G ettier cases are m u ch m o re lik ely to b e th e n o rm th an v isib le o n es. T h e u p sh o t is th is: W h ile S 's h av in g rarely fo u n d h erself to b e G ettierized in th e p ast m ay p ro v id e h er w ith a reaso n fo r th in k in g th at v isib le G ettier cases are rare an d th at, so p h ica l S tu d ies, 5 9 (1 9 9 0 ),p . 1 5 2 . 1 1 2 th u s, sh e p ro b ab ly is n o t th e v ictim o f a v isib le G ettierizatio n w ith resp ectto p , it d o es n o t p ro v id e h er w ith an y reaso n to th in k th at in v isib le G ettier cases are rare, an d w ith o u t th e latter so rt o f reaso n , sh e is n o t ju stified i in b eliev in g th at sh e is n o t b ein g in v isib ly G ettierized w ith resp ect to p . S in ce n eith er o f F eld m an 's reaso n s is ad eq u ate to ju stify iS in b eliev in g th at sh e is n o t G ettierized w ith resp ectto p an d sin ce it is n o t ev en clear w h at so rt o f ev id en ce,if an y ,co u ld ju stifY iS in b eliev in g th at sh e is n o t G ettierized w ith resp ectto p , w e h av e atleast a p rim a fa cie reaso n fo r th in k in g th at n o o n e is ev erju stified i in b eliev in g th at (k 4 ) is satisfied w ith resp ect to a g iv en p ro p o sitio n p . S in ce w e h av e a p r~ m afa cie reaso n to th in k th at n o o n e is ev erju stified jin b eliev in g th at (k 4 ) is satisfied w ith resp ectto a g iv en p ro p o sitio n p , w e h av e a p rim a fa cie reaso n to th in k th at n o o n e ev er satisfies G k l-4 ) o f (JiK ip -l), an d ip so fa cto w e h av e a p rim a fa cie reaso n to th in k th at n o o n e is ev erju stifled iin b eliev in g K ip o n th e b asis o f satisfy in g (JiK iP -l). T h ere are, o f co u rse, o th er w ay s in w h ich w e m ig h t co m ~ to b e ju stified iin b eliev in g th at w e k n O W ith atp w ay s w h ich d o n o t req u ire u s to b e ju stified i in b eliev in g th at w e are n o t firsto rd er G ettierized . A s w e sh all see, th ese w ay s av o id th e seco n d G ettier o b stacle to seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e o n ly to en co u n ter th e th ird G ettier o b stacle to su ch k n o w led g e. V I. T h e th ird an d m o st serio u s G ettier p ro b lem facin g seco n d -o rd er k n o w led g e h as receiv ed alm o st n o atten tio n in th e literatu re. T h e p ro b lem co n cern s seco n d -o rd er G ettierizatio n w h at I call "m eta-G ettierizatio n ". Ju stas first-o rd er G ettierizatio n arises w h en o n e's ju stificatio n fo r p is d efectiv e, m eta-G ettierizatio n o ccu rs w h en o n e's ju stificatio n fo r K ip is d efectiv e. F eld m an is th e o n ly ep istem o lo g istto h av e d iscu ssed m eta-G ettierizatio n in an y d etail, an d h e m ain tain s th at ex am p les o f m eta-G ettierizatio n "are co n triv ed , b u t p o ssib le" .1 8H e th en o ffers su ch a co n triv ed ex am p le w h ich ru n s as fo llo w s:A stu d en t,I'll callh er "F aith ",co m es to ju sti1 8 . F eld m an , "F allib ilism an d K n o w in g th at O n e K n o w s", p . 2 8 1 . 1 1 3 fiab ly b eliev e th at sh e k n o w s th atp o n th e b asis o f th e ex p erttestim o n y o fh er ep istem o lo g y teach er.S in ce F aith really d o es k n o w th at p , F aith h as a testim o n y -b ased ju stified -tru e-b elief th at sh e k n o w s th atp . U n b ek n o w n stto F aith ,h er ep istem o lo g y teach er h as b eco m e sen ile an d n o lo n g er u n d erstan d s w h at h e is assertin g . S o , ev en if w h at h e asserts ab o u t h er ep istem ic statu s w ith resp ect to p is tru e, F aith 's ju stificatio n is d efectiv e sin ce th e ep istem ic p ro n o u n cem en ts o f a sen ile ep istem o lo g ist are n o t ap p ro p riately co n n ected w ith th e tru th . I w ill retu rn to F eld m an 's ex am p le m o m en tarily ,b u t first I w ish to co n sid er a less co n triv ed ex am p le. T h e y ear is 1 9 5 6 .P ro fesso r C leav er,a p re-G ettier ep istem o lo g ist, em b races th e trad itio n al an aly sis o f k n o w led g e an d ju stifiab ly so , w h at w ith o v er 2 0 0 0 y ears o f ep istem o lo g icalh isto ry o n h is sid e. M o reo v er, C leav er is an in tern alist (th o u g h , w ith th e in tern alist/ ex tern alist d istin ctio n o v er a d ecad e aw ay ,h e d o esn 't realize it y et), sin ce h e m ain tain s th atju stificatio n is a fu n ctio n ex clu siv ely o f ev id en ce accessib le to th e co g n izer. T h u s, th e th eo ry o f k n o w led g e w h ich C leav er ju stifiab ly accep ts is th e trad itio n al an aly sis: (T A ) (T A * ) K ip = =(p & B p & JiP ). S k n O W S ith at p iff: (tal) p , (ta2 ) S b eliev es th atp , an d (ta3 ) S is ju stified i in b eliev in g th atp . F o r a p erso n in C leav er's ep istem ically n aiv e situ atio n , it is relativ ely easy to b e ju stified i in accep tin g K iP . A ll an y o n e w h o ju stifia b lY i accep ts (T A * ) n eed d o in o rd er to b e ju stified i in b eliev in g th at sh e k n O W S ith atp is satisfy th e a n a lysa n s o f: (JiK ip -2 ) S is ju stified i in b eliev in g th at K ip if: G k 2 -1 ) S is ju stified i in b eliev in g th atp , G k 2 -2 ) S is ju stified iin b eliev in g th atS b eliev es th at p , an d G k 2 -3 ) S isju stified iin b eliev in g th atS isju stified iin b eliev in g th atp . N o w , fo r an y p ro p o sitio n p th at C leav er k n O W S i,ifh e b eliev es th at h e 1 1 4 k n o w s th atp an d ifh e isju stified jin b eliev in g th ath e k n o w s th atp o n th e b asis o f h is ju stified ib eliefs (T A ),(T A * ),an d (J iK ip -2 ),th en h e w ill h av e a ju stified j-tru e-b elief th at h e k n o w s th at p , w h ich falls sh o rt o f k n o w led g e b ecau se h is ju stificatio n essen tia lly d ep en d s o n th e ju stified i-b u t1 'a lse b eliefs (T A ) an d (T A * ).T h e fact is th at an y tim e C leav er co m es to b eliev e th ath e k n o w s a p ro p o sitio n o n th e b asis o f h is ju stified i-b u t-false b eliefs (T A )an d (T A * )h e w ill au to m atically b e m eta-G ettierized .N o tice, m o reo v er,th at p rio r to 1 9 6 3 ev ery ep istem o lo g istw as in th e n aiv e ep istem o lo g icalsitu atio n ju st attrib u ted to C leav er,an d as a resu lt,n o ep istem o lo g istsp rio r to 1 9 6 3 ev er p o ssessed seco n d -o rd er in tem alistic k n o w led g e, sin ce th eir ju stificatio n fo rb eliev in g an y g iv en self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n K ip w o u ld h av e in ev itab ly rested o n a ju stified i-b u t-false b elief ab o u t th e n atu re o f k n o w led g e. B ack to th e p resen t. A re th o se o f u s w h o g rew u p in th e p o stG ettier en lig h ten m en t an y b etter o ff th an C leav er w h en it co m es to m eta-G ettierizatio n ? T h at d ep en d s o n w h eth er an y o f u s h as a ju stified -tru e-b eliefreg ard in g th e n atu re o fk n o w led g ei w h ich sp ecifies th e co n d itio n s n ecessary an d su fficien t fo r S to k n o w th atp . G iv en th at th e m y riad o f m u tu ally ex clu siv e ep istem o lo g ies cu rren tly p ro p o sed h av e ro u g h ly eq u al n u m b ers o f p ro p o n en ts, it fo llo w s th at m o st ep istem o lo g ists h av e a false ep istem o lo g y .A n d sin ce n o ep istem o lo g y to d ate is im m u n e to o b jectio n ,itis d o u b tfu lth at an y o fu s h o ld a tru e ep istem o lo g y (n o m atter h o w w ellju stified iw e m ay b e in accep tin g o u r o w n ep istem o lo g y ).G iv en th e ex trem e lik elih o o d th at w e all h o ld false ep istem o lo g ies, w h en ev er w e co m e to b eliev e a g iv en self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n K ip o n th e ju stificato ry i b asis o f o u r p referred ep istem o lo g y ,w e are alm o stcertain to b eco m e y et an o th er m eta-G ettierizatio n casu alty . T h ere is, o f co u rse, o n e w ay to b eco m e ju stified j in h o ld in g a g iv en self-k n o w led g e p ro p o sitio n K ip w h ich d o es n o t d ep en d o n o n e's o w n false th eo ry o f k n o w led g e,n am ely ,to fo llo w F aith 's ex am p le an d ask an ex p ert. T h e p ro b lem is th at it is ex trem ely lik ely th at an y ex p erty o u ask is o p eratin g w ith a false ep istem o lo g y ,an d so ev en if th e ex p ertis rig h tin h er p ro n o u n cem en tth at y o u k n o w th atp , y o u r ju stificatio n i fo r b eliev in g th at y o u k n O W ith atp w ill b e d efectiv e b ecau se it w ill rest o n th at ex p ert's ju stified j-b u t-false ep istem o lo g y . F eld m an th in k s th at in o rd er to co m e u p w ith a case o f 1 1 5 m eta-G ettierizatio n o n e m u st co m e u p w ith an ex trem ely co n triv ed ex am p le in v o lv in g a sen ile ep istem o lo g ist,b u t h e is m istak en . T h e tru th is alm o st an y san e an d so b er ep istem o lo g istw ill d o . I C o n clu sio n W e h av e seen th at th e G ettier p ro b lem p o ses th ree d istin ct p ro b lem s fo r th e w o u ld -b e seco n d -o rd er k n o w er: (1 ) T h e p ro b lem o f a ctu a l first-o rd er G ettierizatio n w h ich p reclu d es K jK ip b y p reclu d in g K iP ; (2 ) th e p ro b lem o f th e p o ssib ilities o f "all-tru e-ev id en ce" an d "in v isib le" first-o rd er G ettierizatio n s w h ich ap p ear to p reclu d e attain in g K jK ip th ro u g h (J iK ip -l) b y b lo ck in g satisfactio n o f U k 1 -4 ); an d m o st im p o rtan tly b u t least reco g n ized , (3 ) th e p ro b lem o f m eta-G ettierizatio n w h ich th reaten s to u n d erm in e all p u rp o rted in stan ces o fK jK iP , sin ce all in stan ces o f JjK jp seem to b e g ro u n d ed in false ep istem o lo g ies (eith er o n e's o w n o r th e ex p ert's). T h ese th ree p ro b lem s tak en to g eth er p ro v id e u s w ith a stro n g p rim a fa cie case fo r in tem alistic m etaep istem o ~ o g ical sk ep ticism , i.e. th e th esis th at n o o n e ev er k n O W S jth at o n e k n O W S ith atp . P erh ap s th ere is a rare an d ex trem ely fo rtu n ate ep istem o lo g ist w ith an en tirely tru e ep istem o lo g y o u t th ere w h o can o n so m e o ccasio n s m an ag e to av o id all th ree p ro b lem s, b u t o n e th in g is clear: W h en in tem alists claim th at "W h en ev er w e k n o w so m eth in g w e eith er d o , o r at least can , b y reflectin g ,d irectly k n o w th at w e are k n o w in g it",th ey are m istak en . 1 9 1 9 . F in an cial su p p o rt fo r th is p ro ject w as p ro v id ed b y an N IU S u m m er R esearch G ran t, fo r w h ich ! am g ratefu l. E arlier v ersio n s o f th is p ap er w ere p resen ted at th e A m erican P h ilo so p h icalA sso ciatio n P acific D iv isio n M eetin g s, th e Illin o is P h ilo so p h ical A sso ciatio n M eetin g s, th e B led C o n feren ce o n E p istem o lo g y ,an d th e M id so u th P h ilo so p h y C o n feren ce.I w o u ld lik e to th an k th o se in atten d an ce fo r th eir h elp fu l su g g estio n s. S p ecial th an k s to m y co m m en tato rs, R ich ard F eld m an , A n n L ev ey ,an d S tev e W ag n er,fo r th eir d etailed w ritten co m m en ts. A n y m istak es th at rem ain are so lely m y o w n . 1 1 6 R E F E R E N C E S C h ish o lm , R o d erick , T h eo ry o f K n o w led g e, 2 d . ed itio n (E n g lew o o d C liffs, N J: P ren tice H all, 1 9 7 7 ). D an to , A rth u r, "O n K n o w in g th at W e K n o w ", in E p istem o lo g y: N ew E ssa ys in th e T h eo ry o fK n o w led g e,ed .A v ru m S tro ll(W estp o rt,C o n n .: G reen w o o d P ress, 1 9 6 7 ),p p . 3 2 -5 3 . E n g el, Jr.,M y lan ,"P erso n al an d D o x astic Ju stificatio n in E p istem o lo g y ", P h ilo so p h ica l S tu d ies, 6 7 (1 9 9 2 ), p p . 1 3 3 -1 5 0 . F eld m an , R ich ard , "F allib ilism an d K n o w in g th at O n e K n o w s", P h ilo so p h ica l R eview , X C (1 9 8 1 ),p p . 2 6 6 -2 8 2 . -, "A n A lleg ed D efect in G ettier C o u n ter-E x am p les", A u stra la sia n Jo u rn a l o f P h ilo so p h y, 5 2 (1 9 7 4 ), p p . 6 8 -6 9 . F u m erto n , R ich ard , M eta ep istem o lo g y a n d S kep ticism (L an h am , M ary lan d : R o m an an d L ittlefield , 1 9 9 5 ). G ettier, E d m u n d , "Is Ju stified T ru e B elief K n o w led g e?", A n a lysis, 2 3 (1 9 6 3 ), p p . 1 2 1 -1 2 3 . G in et, C arl, "W h at M u st B e A d d ed to K n o w in g to O b tain K n o w in g th at O n e K n o w s?" S yn th ese, 2 1 (1 9 7 0 ), p p . 1 6 3 -1 8 6 . H ilp in en , R isto , "K n o w in g th at O n e K n o w s an d th e C lassical D efin itio n o f K n o w led g e", S yn th ese, 2 1 (1 9 7 0 ), p p . 1 0 9 -1 3 2 . H in tik k a, Jaak k o , "'K n o w in g th at O n e K n o w s' R ev iew ed ", S yn th ese, 2 1 (1 9 7 0 ), p p . 1 4 1 -1 6 2 . -, K n o w led g e a n d B elief A n In tro d u ctio n to th e L o g ic o f th e T w o N o tio n s (Ith aca, N Y : C o rn ell U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 6 2 ). K lein , P eter, "A P ro p o sed D efin itio n o f P ro p o sitio n al K n o w led g e", Jo u rn a l o f P h ilo so p h y, L X V III (1 9 7 1 ), p p . 4 7 1 -4 8 2 . L eh rer, K eith , K n o w led g e (O x fo rd : T h e C laren d o n P ress, 1 9 7 4 ). P rich ard , H . A ., K n o w led g e a n d P ercep tio n (O x fo rd : T h e C laren d o n P ress, 1 9 5 0 ). R eid , T h o m as, A n In q u iry in to th e H u m a n M in d o n th e P rin cip les o fC o m m a n S en se an d E ssa ys o n th e In tellectu a l P o w ers o f M a n , in T h e C o m p lete W o rks o f T h o m a s R eid , ed . W illiam H am ilto n , 6 th ed itio n (E d in b u rg h : M aclach lan an d S tew art; an d L o n d o n : L o n g m an , G reen , L o n g 1 1 7 m an , R o b erts, an d G reen , 1 8 6 3 ). R o th , M ich ael, "T h e W all an d th e S h ield : K -K R eco n sid ered ", P h ilo so p h ica l S tu d ies, 5 9 (1 9 9 0 ), p p . 1 3 7 -1 5 7 . S k y rm s, B rian , "T h e E x p licatio n o f 'X k n o w s th at p "', Jo u rn a l o fP h ilo so p h y, 6 4 (1 9 6 7 ), p p . 3 7 3 -3 8 9 .